The 
Introduction
With a rapidly growing number of critical applications deployed on the Internet today, including financial transactions and voice over IP, Internet security is of increasing concern. The interdomain routing protocol, BGP (Border Gateway Protocol), plays an important role in the Internet infrastructure. However, given the lack of security guarantee in its original design, BGP is vulnerable to various types of misconfiguration and attacks [5, 13] .
One type of routing protocol attacks with severe impact is the prefix hijacking attack, which injects and propagates false routes to the Internet, potentially causing traffic to be redirected to the attacker networks. There are two general types of prefix hijacks [18, 4, 10] : injecting a bogus route with a false origin AS (i.e., origin AS attacks) and injecting an incorrect route with a false AS path segment but a legitimate origin AS. There has been much evidence for the former attack [6, 12] , which has caused serious damage on network availability but is relatively easy to detect. However, a special type of origin AS attack, i.e., sub-prefix attack, is more difficult to detect and prevent. In such an attack, the attacker announces a more specific prefix than the original prefix, and the route to the sub-prefix is likely used by all the routers due to longest prefix matching. The recent incident of YouTube's sub-prefix hijacking [16] serves as a real-world example of the severity of such attacks.
A fundamental reason for all these real-world prefix hijacking attacks is that the current BGP system lacks any secure binding between a prefix and its owner. Many secure BGP protocols have been proposed, e.g., S-BGP [19] , SPV [11] , KC-BGP [23] . However, none is widely deployed primarily due to two deployment obstacles: a lack of the global PKI infrastructure and the high computational overhead of processing BGP updates. The seminal work in this area, S-BGP, requires two PKIs, one for address ownership attestation and one for route announcement attestation. In S-BGP, the prefix owner has an asymmetric private key for each prefix, generated by a global trust entity. Each AS along a path will verify that the prefix actually belongs to the AS with the corresponding public key. To ensure that the route cannot be tampered with by malicious ASes, each AS signs the update with its private key. Other secure BGP work, e.g., SPV [11] , KC-BGP [23] , and path stability based improvement [7] , have all focused on the performance improvement of the second phase -generating/verifying route attestation. SoBGP reduces overhead by only providing ownership authentication with private key Authorization Certificate assigned by a global PKI.
To our best knowledge, no existing work attempted to improve the efficiency and flexibility of the first phase -certifying prefix origin/ownership, which is also critical to the efficient operation of any secure BGP protocol. In this paper, we propose a novel scheme based on hash chains and regular public/private key pairs of two neighboring routers overcoming deployment hurdles in providing prefix origin/ownership attestation. HC-BGP is a complimentary effort to all above proposals in the second phase.
The key idea of HC-BGP is inspired by an empirical study we conducted to understand the most common routing dynamics. By analyzing three months of routing updates archived in RouteViews from 21 vantage points, we observe that most routing updates do not involve origin AS changes. To optimize for the common case, we propose to use the one-way hash chain mechanism to secure the prefix ownership in a light-weight fashion. HC-BGP guarantees that the permission to announce any sub-prefix is granted by the owner of the cover-prefix. Thus, our scheme not only secures the relevant prefix, but also secures its sub-prefix space, i.e., all its possible sub-prefixes, effectively defending against the stealthy sub-prefix hijacking attacks with false origin. For the rare cases of announcing new (sub)prefixes, an initialization step is performed to bootstrap the hash chain, which involves a slightly more computationally expensive asymmetric-key algorithm. The initialization is optimized to only require public key exchange limited to two neighboring ASes instead of a global PKI.
To prevent tampering with the initialization process and the replay attack during the subsequent route propagation, we exploit the Internet hierarchical structure and the business relationship among ASes to impose a partial ordering on the route propagation. We prove that no replay attack can succeed if every AS follows the guideline. Note that the partial ordering does not change the BGP route selection when preventing the replay attack.
In summary, HC-BGP is a light-weight approach to provide prefix ownership security without a global PKI. Moreover, its design to connect the sub-prefix announcement with coverprefix ownership is effective in preventing sub-prefix hijacking attacks. Furthermore, using our scheme, network operators can still enjoy the flexibility of common routing practices such as multi-homing, prefix aggregation, and de-aggregation.
The paper is organized as follows. We give the background of prefix hijacking and an overview of proposed protocol in §2. We conduct empirical data analysis in §3. We present the HC-BGP protocol in §4, §5, and §7. We finally evaluate its performance in §8 and §9.
Background and Overview
Prefix hijacking is a serious BGP security threat by which attackers steal IP addresses belonging to other networks. The attacker AS injects false routes into the global routing table by announcing another network's prefix.The stolen address blocks can be used for other malicious activities such as spamming or denial-of-service attacks where the attacker's identity is concealed. The fundamental problem that accounts for this attack is a lack of prefix ownership authentication in the BGP system. In the following, we first review several types of prefix hijacking attacks. We then describe our threat model, followed by our design requirements and comparison to existing work.
Prefix hijacking attacks with false origin
IP prefix hijacking can be carried out in several ways [10, 24, 4] . The attacker can either blackhole the victim's traffic by advertising an invalid route with a false origin, or intercept the traffic by inserting a false nexthop, possibly leaving the origin AS unchanged. In this paper, we focus on the attack with false origin which is due to a lack of address certification and usually results in severe consequence such as reachability problems. Interception-based hijack can be partially addressed by encryption based solutions [21] . The false-origin prefix hijacking can be further categorized based on size of the address block announced. Below are the two categories, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Full prefix hijack, where the attacker announces exactly the same prefix already announced by the victim. Other networks will select one such route to adopt. In this case, the Internet is partially polluted. For example, in Figure 1(a) , both the attacker and the victim announce the same prefix 10.1.0.0/16. Consequently, AS2 and AS3 may prefer the attacker's route because of the shorter AS path.
Sub-prefix hijack, where the attacker announces only a subnet of a prefix announced by the victim and this subnet is not announced previously. Unless filtered, this new sub-prefix is injected into the forwarding table regardless of the route of the existing prefix. Due to the longest prefix matching policy, traffic destined to this subnet follows the false route of the sub-prefix. Therefore, most of the Internet is likely polluted. In Figure 1( 
Threat model
We describe the threat model. Given a network G, each AS is assigned a set of IP prefixes. Each AS can only announce prefixes it owns. A prefix p is the set of IP addresses announced in a single routing announcement. A sub-prefix p of p is a subset of the addresses in p, i.e., p ⊂ p, where p as p 's cover-prefix. Among all the sub-prefixes of p, we define the largest sub-prefix p as the direct sub-prefix of p, i.e., if ¬∃p 2 , p ⊂ p 2 ⊂ p, then p is the direct sub-prefix of p and p is the direct cover-prefix. In subsequent discussions, we refer cover-prefix as direct cover-prefix.
We first define the attacks of interest, prefix hijacking attacks with false origin. If p belongs to AS 1 , then any other AS x announcing p with AS x as the origin AS, is considered as hijacking with false origin. This type of attack has two sub-categories: 1) An AS can advertise a prefix originated from another AS. 2) An AS can advertise any subset of another prefix originated from another AS. We note these two categories cover all known hijacking incidents in the past.
After AS x hijacks p, in most cases, it blackholes a portion of all the traffic destined to AS 1 . But it can also tunnel the traffic back to AS 1 to be more stealthy to carry out an interception attack [4] . We also consider this attack type. Note that we do not consider any attacks modifying other parts of the AS path, e.g., modifying path (AS x , AS 2 , AS 1 ) to be (AS x , AS 1 ).
Solution requirements
A practical protocol that can prevent the above attacks should satisfy the following requirements.
1. Ensuring Origin Attestation: It should prevent both full prefix and sub-prefix false-origin hijacking. If an attacker advertises the prefix currently announced by its owner, or a new sub-prefix covered by a larger prefix owned by other networks, the route to the attacker should be discarded.
2. Flexible: It should support the flexibility for legitimate multiple origin AS (MOAS) and traffic engineering. One prefix can be announced by two ASes for several legitimate reasons [25] : the prefix of the exchange points is usually announced by more than one AS connected at the exchange point; a small customer without its own AS number may use a private AS number to multi-home to two providers which announce the prefix simultaneously. Our solution needs to accommodate these dynamics.
For traffic engineering purposes, one prefix could be deaggregated to multiple sub-prefixes announced independently of the prefix. On the other hand, the owner can also aggregate a set of sub-prefixes to a single large prefix to limit routing table size. Our solution also needs to provide flexibility for aggregation/de-aggregation operations.
3. Incrementally deployable: Like all other secure BGP protocols, it is impossible to force all ASes to adopt the new protocol simultaneously. The adoptability of a protocol highly depends on its incremental benefit [8] . The new protocol needs to support incremental deployment to provide enough incentives for ISPs to deploy it.
4. Light-weight: A major concern for previously proposed secure BGP protocols is the high overhead for both computation and storage. To ensure practical adoptability, we need to design a solution with low overhead.
The proposed HC-BGP satisfies all four requirements.
Comparison with previous secure BGP protocols
Several protocols have been proposed to enhance BGP security by incorporating cryptographic mechanisms to provide confidentiality, integrity, and origin authentication. S-BGP [19] is the first comprehensive secure routing protocol. It relies on two public key infrastructures (PKIs) to secure AS identity and association between networks and ASes. Each route contains two attestations (digitally signed signatures), one for the origin authentication and one for the route integrity. In reality, due to the large number of sign and verify operations, S-BGP is too costly to deploy.
Most of the followup work to S-BGP focus on reducing the computational complexity of the second security properties of S-BGP, i.e., generating/verifying the route attestation. For example, SPV [11] utilizes purely symmetric cryptographic primitives, a set of one-time signatures, to improve efficiency. Butler et al. [7] reduced the complexity of S-BGP by exploring path stability. Along the angle of reducing the overhead of asymmetric key, Hen et al. [23] proposed a scheme using key chain to improve its performance. Only one existing work, Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) [17] , focuses on providing address attestation. However, soBGP still uses one PKI to authenticate the address ownership and AS identity. Each soBGP router first builds a topology database securely, including the address ownership, organization relationship and topology. Aiello et al. builds an address ownership proof system [3] which still uses a centralized infrastructure requiring gathering address delegation information.
In summary, all previous secure BGP protocols leave the prefix ownership assurance unchanged. S-BGP relies on the address attestation with the assistance from the centralized trust entity ICANN. SPV proposes using identity based cryptography (IBC) to make the public key distribution more flexible. However, these address attestation methods suffer from: 1) dependence on a global PKI; 2) the need for a verification operation for each routing update; 3) inflexibility for origin AS changes; 4) inability to handle subprefix hijacking.
In contrast, HC-BGP is a new approach to prefix ownership authentication that is both more efficient and flexible than previous approaches. Our scheme uses the light-weight hash chain mechanism and the less frequent cryptographic operations, and hence is efficient in terms of computational complexity and memory consumption. Our scheme does not rely on a global PKI, and hence it provides much more flexibility for traffic engineering in terms of origin AS changes, address allocation/de-allocation.
Hypothesis and empirical analysis
Our goal is to design a practical and efficient solution to secure prefix ownership. Towards this goal, we first seek to gain insights into several key characteristics of the prefixes announced in the Internet. We investigate two hypotheses that directly relate to the design of an efficient secure protocol:
Hypothesis 1: For each prefix, the set of its origin ASes is quite stable. This property directly affects frequency for updating the secure association.
Hypothesis 2: The aggregation/de-aggregation dynamics for each prefix is infrequent. This property relates to the association changes across prefixes.
To analyze these two hypotheses, we perform an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of the origin changes as well as the distribution of the prefixes/sub-prefixes.
We study these aspects using three months of BGP data, Figure 2 . Across the entire three months, we only observe 52 prefixes announced by new origin ASes. This means that the set of origin ASes for each MOAS prefix is quite stable. Second, we needed to provide the flexibility of the coexistence of the prefix and sub-prefix. We found that among the total of 214,043 prefixes in the global routing table, only 8% (17115) had sub-prefixes. Among them, though some prefixes had many sub-prefixes, we found that 90% had less than 10 direct sub-prefixes, as shown in Figure 3 .
Finally, we analyzed the dynamics of aggregation/deaggregation. In Figure 4 , each Aggregation event refers to when one sub-prefix is withdrawn, and its cover-prefix still exists, and each De-aggregation event refers to when when a new sub-prefix is announced. The duration of aggregation is the time period when only the cover-prefix exists, and the duration of de-aggregation is the period when only the sub-prefix exists. The figure shows aggregation and de-aggregation occur rarely. The short durations of less than 10 minutes are most likely due to BGP convergence.
From the above analysis, we draw the following observations confirming the two hypotheses above which are then exploited in the design of HC-BGP.
1. Only a few prefixes have more than one origin AS. Among them, most have only two origin ASes. 2. The set of origin ASes for MOAS prefixes is stable. 3. Majority of the prefixes do not have sub-prefixes. 4. Neither prefix aggregation/de-aggregation nor prefix origin changes are often. A key observation that guides our HC-BGP protocol design is that most of the proposed secure BGP protocols require origin authentication upon any UPDATE message for this prefix. In contrast, because our problem is to defend against the fraudulent origin (sub)prefix hijacking, we only need to authenticate the binding between a given origin AS and the prefix, which is thus, only needed when the binding changes. Guided by this observation, we can design a much more efficient protocol to secure this binding.
HC-BGP Protocol
We now present HC-BGP, a new secure BGP protocol that prevents both full prefix and sub-prefix hijacking attacks. We first describe the one-way hash chain building block, our trust model, followed by the protocol.
One-way hash chains
One-way hash chain is a widely used light-weight cryptographic method to provide security. It was first proposed by Lamport [14] for password protection. Using a cryptographic hash function h(s), a client first needs to use other security methods to notify the server of the initial value h n (s). For subsequent communication, the client only needs to present router R i s public key k = h n−1 (s) to the server. The server computes h(k) = h(h n−1 (s)) to compare with the pre-stored h n (s). If they match, the server verifies the client identity.
Hash chain has the following key properties. It is useful in cases where an authentication is done once, all the following values for subsequent authentication can be derived efficiently by repeatedly computing the hash function value. The other end can easily verify each new value. The one-way hash function guarantees that given a value h i (s), it is computationally infeasible for the attacker to derive the secret s. Moreover, many hash functions can provide the second pre-image collision resistant: it is impossible to find another s such that h(s ) = h i+1 (s). HC-BGP uses hash chains to secure the binding between the origin AS and the prefix efficiently in all subsequent UP-DATE messages once the first binding is authenticated.
Trust model
As discussed in §2.4, all previous secure BGP protocols require a global PKI to provide authenticity. Every AS in the Internet must establish a trust relationship with this global entity and depend on it for any changes. Each AS needs to hold all other ASes' keys. Especially, for address attestation, all existing secure BGP methods rely on the PKI. This has imposed significant management burden, and has received a fair share of criticism [20] .
Unlike previous work, we rely on the relationship between every pair of neighboring ASes to provide authenticity. We do not require each AS to know all other ASes' key. Instead, each AS establishes a trust relationship with its directly connected neighbors: if AS A and AS B are neighbors, A and B trusts each other, denoted as A ↔ B. This pair-wise trust model is consistent with the current commercial relationship established between ASes. Thus, the trust is easy to establish in practice; for instance, the keys between two entities can be exchanged in the contract. The two tnetities can even decide to use either symmetric key or asymmetric key flexibly themselves.
In the context of prefix hijacking, we assume that each AS trusts its provider which does not have incentives to hijack customers' addresses as customer traffic will always traverses its network. Moreover, we assume all Tier-1 ASes are trustworthy as they are large ISPs with careful network management. Historically, there has been no known events of any Tier-1 AS launching hijacking. Note that the trust relationship is established at the AS level. We assume all the routers within one AS behave consistently as it is easier to manage inside the ISP network. Finally, if one prefix has multiple providers as origin ASes, we assume that the prefix owner will communicate with all these providers to ensure the consistency of the hash value.
The basic protocol
The key idea of our protocol is to exploit the light-weight security property of one-way hash chain to verify the association between the origin and the announced prefixes in any route advertisement. First, the AS who decides to deploy this scheme needs to propagate the hash chain's initial value to other ASes in a secure manner. After the initialization process, the origin AS starts announcing the prefix with its latest hash value. Each receiver then verifies if the route is from the previously authenticated origin via the attached hash value. The origin AS needs to update the hash value only in one of the following three cases: (1) the prefix's origin AS changes, (2) any of its sub-prefixes is newly announced, (3) the prefix is completely withdrawn. Note that normal withdrawals and announcements caused by an intermediate AS switching between alternative paths reuse the same hash value, as such changes do not involve the origin changes.
The overall protocol for prefix owner R i is sketched in Table 2. For any update receiver R i+1 , the verification process is shown in Table 3 with the terminology defined in Table 1 . We now introduce each step of the protocol. Table 3 . The protocol at receiver R i+1 .
Hash-chain Initialization
Receive the initial value for prefix p from neighbor Ri, Verify and store ((h n (sp)) k
. Store h n (sp). 1. Hash-chain initialization. Each prefix has an initial value. The origin AS needs to propagate the initial value to other ASes securely. We assume that neighboring eBGP peering routers can easily exchange their keys, using an out-ofband mechanism needed for establishing the peering session. The initial values are propagated hop-by-hop between participating neighboring routers. For each prefix owned by AS R i , R i first assigns the prefix an initial hash chain value, which is then propagated to its neighbors encrypted by k − i . Its neighboring router R i+1 first decrypts using R i 's public key, stores the hash value, encrypts it with its own key, and then propagates the hash value further. This is a one-time overhead for each originating prefix. When the hash chain value is exhausted, the initialization is performed again.
Prefix announcement
Note that in the above protocol, any malicious AS along the propagation path can modify the initialization value. We impose a partial ordering to limit the propagation of the modified initial value to a very small range. More precisely, we can eliminate any pollution except for attacker's customers with all other ASes guaranteed to be safe assuming full deployment. The details are described in §5 with other corner cases, e.g., message loss, discussed in §7.
2. Prefix announcement. If the prefix is announced with the same origin AS as the previous update, or the sub-prefix is announced with the same origin AS as its cover-prefix, there is no need to update the hash chain. The hash chain value however is updated in the following two scenarios.
2.1 Origin AS changes. The prefix owner may modify its origin AS by for instance multi-homing to several providers for load balancing. In this case, we rely on the prefix owner to coordinate a consistent hash value among the origin ASes. It needs to inform the new origin AS with the latest hash chain value. When a new origin AS R i starts to announce a prefix p, it needs to update the hash chain value to h c−1 (s p ). Note that this is only performed when the origin AS changes.
2.2 Sub-prefix announcement. Whenever a sub-prefix is initially announced, it should be attached with not only its own hash value, but also its cover-prefix's updated hash value, indicating that the cover-prefix's origin AS has authenticated the announcement of the sub-prefix.
When R i announces prefix p's sub-prefix p 1 , it undertakes the following actions. It first propagates the initial hash value h n (s p1 ) (step 1) and then announces the sub-prefix:
The receiver validates h c−1 (sp) with h c (sp) to check this announcement is authorized by the cover-prefix p. The receiver then compares h n−1 (s p1 ) with h n (s p1 ) to verify the hash value of sub-prefix p 1 . This announcement ensures a connection between the cover-prefix and sub-prefix, effectively preventing sub-prefix hijacking. Under one scenario the hash value needs to be updated. When the origin AS R i decides to withdraw an existing prefix p for the long term, e.g., due to aggregation or changing provider, it needs to include the updated hash value. This is to prevent an attacker from announcing p with R i as the origin AS and the old hash value after the long-term withdrawal.
If the hash chain value in the withdrawal is the same as the latest one, then the receiver treats it as normal withdrawal and accepts it. Otherwise, if the withdrawal is sent together with an updated hash value, suggesting that the prefix origin withdraws route to this prefix. The receiver accepts the withdrawal only if the hash chain value matches. Once the prefix is withdrawn, the receiver does not accept any announcement for this prefix with an old hash chain value. Figure 5 illustrates how HC-BGP prevents hijacking introduced previously. For both full prefix and sub-prefix hijacking, AS 2 discards the false route from the attacker because h 999 (s 2 ) does not match the stored hash value.
We now briefly analyze the computational complexity of HC-BGP. Detailed analysis is presented in §9. HC-BGP introduces two sets of computational overhead: asymmetric key based initialization and hash chain based validation. Fortunately, unlike previous schemes, both operations are rarely performed. The initialization, an expensive operation, is only performed in two cases: when an AS begins to deploy this scheme or when a new sub-prefix is announced. This is only a one-time cost. The hash-chain value generation/verification, which is light-weight, is only performed when a prefix's origin AS(es) changes, a new sub-prefix is announced or withdrawn.
Advanced protocol: partial ordering in HC-BGP announcement
The basic protocol has two security holes: 1) during initialization, an attacker can modify the initial value received from its neighbor. 2) during the propagation of hash chain value updates, an attacker can tamper the value. It can also replay the value by announcing the prefix as originated from its own AS. In the following, we present a partial ordering algorithm that can effectively prevent these cases. We use the replay attack as an example. The algorithm can also be applied to prevent attacks during initialization.
The replay attack is illustrated in Figure 6 (a). Prefix p's actual owner AS AS 0 starts to announce prefix p with hash value h i (s). It announces to its provider AS 1 , which then propagates to its customer. If one of AS 1 's customer M is malicious, it hijacks the prefix by announcing p to its multihomed provider AS 3 with h i (s), upon receiving h i (s) from AS 1 . To avoid conflicting origin ASes, M may choose not to announce h i (s) to AS 1 . In this case, M successfully pollutes a set of ASes connected to AS 3 .
To prevent such attacks, we explore the fact that there exists a certain delay between the time when AS 0 announces h i (s) and when M learns it. The key idea of our solution is to amplify such delay to ensure that h i (s) from AS 0 is propagated to the majority of the Internet before M learns it. This is achieved by exploiting the Internet hierarchical structure to impose a partial ordering on the hash chain propagation throughout the Internet. We prove that by following these guidelines, the BGP system reaches a secure state, such that replay attack is impossible.
We first introduce the notation used. An update for prefix p and its hash value h i (s) is denoted as U p . p's actual owner is AS 0 . All Tier-1 ASes in the Internet form a set {T ier − 1}. The commercial relationship between ASes includes customer-provider and peer-peer. The valid routing policy determines the AS path to be of the form of CustomerProvider* Peer-Peer? Provider-Customer* (known as the AS path "valley-free" rule [9] ), where "*" denotes zero or more occurrence of such an AS edge and "?" at most one occurrence. The propagation of U p should follow guidelines below. Guideline: (Phase-1 and 2 may proceed concurrently.) Intuitively, the guidelines enforce the route propagation order following the trust relationship. Note that we do not limit or change any route selection in the guideline. First, we do not restrict any route propagation but only impose some delay. Second, we do not change the route selection policy. In Phase-3, AS i first determines the valid h i (s) from its provider and Tier-1 peers, which it trusts. AS i can still select the best route among all routes with valid h i (s). We now prove the security guarantee of the guideline. If T op(D) {T ier − 1} = ∅, let's examine the hypothesis that there is no Peer-Peer edge between these two sets. By definition, neither T op(D) nor {T ier − 1} have providers. Thus there cannot be any Customer↔ Provider edges between them. If there is no edge between them, then a route originated from {T ier− 1} can only go through Provider→ Customer→ Provider/Peer to T op(D), which violates the "valley-free" rule. Thus, the hypothesis is rejected and Lemma 1 holds.
Lemma 2 Every AS receives U p . The reachability is not affected.
Proof: According to the valley-free policy, the route is propagated in one of the following ways: (1) customer→
Category 1 is allowed in Phase-1. Category 2-5 are allowed in Phase-3 with some delay. Note that in Phase-3, each AS sends the route to all its customers and peers even if the route is learned from this customer. Therefore, every AS waits for finite time unless it is disconnected from all its providers. Thus, the guidelines do not disallow any route propagation. The reachability is not affected.
Lemma 3 Every AS only accepts U p from AS 0 . The malicious route is not be accepted by any other networks except the attacker and its direct customers.
Proof:
We prove this recursively. In Phase-1, the owner AS 0 has the initial U p . By traversing all the Customer→Provider edges, we obtain a DAG D. If AS i is in D, it learns the route from its customer AS i−1 in Phase-1. Assuming providers do not have incentives to hijack customers' route, U AS-level path between any AS and the Tier-1 ASes is only 3-4 hops long. The additional delay is only proportional to the hierarchical level of the Internet topology.
Incremental deployment
In §5 we proved that, by imposing partial ordering, the entire BGP system reaches a secure state, assuming full deployment. However, incremental deployability is an important property for practical adoption. We enhance HC-BGP under partial deployment by two additional rules. Constructing monitoring barrier by participating ASes. The current design of HC-BGP under partial deployment is not guaranteed to be secure because the legacy ASes might send the hash value to attacker before the legitimate route propagates to the Tier-1 ASes. In the example shown in Figure 6 , if AS 1 does not deploy HC-BGP, then M receives the update via AS 1 at time 00:02 to pollute AS 3 and AS 4 . In this case, the value is leaked from AS 1 to M .
To overcome this problem, we develop one more rule that uses all participating ASes to monitor and prevent leaking hash value to attacker from their legacy neighbors. We first assume that each AS knows whether its neighbor has deployed HC-BGP. Specifically, when AS i receives an updated route from its non-provider legacy neighbor AS i+1 , AS i will first check if the updated value has propagated to Tier-1 ASes based on guideline (3). If not, AS i delays propagating the route from AS i+1 until the value is propagated to Tier-1 ASes. Thus, all the participating ASes like AS i construct a monitoring barrier which effectively delays the propagation of updated hash value to the attacker. This rule enables the deployed ASes to stop leaking the hash value through the legacy ASes to the attacker. Conflict detection. Even with monitoring barrier, we cannot guarantee all ASes are free from pollution under partial deployment. Thus, we rely on participating ASes to detect conflicting hash values. In the same example in Figure 6 , AS 4 receives two inconsistent routes, i.e., two different origin ASes announcing p with the same h i (s), indicating the occurrence of hijacking. There are multiple ways that AS 4 can identify the attacker AS using the knowledge of the topology. For example, the presence of a link between AS 1 and M but no link between AS 3 and AS 0 indicates that M learns the message from AS 1 . We leave details of such a scheme as future work. 
Discussion
We discuss two corner cases and their solutions.
Resilience to message loss. Lost messages could cause inconsistency in HC-BGP. Since BGP uses the reliable transport protocol TCP, BGP packet loss is unlikely to happen. However, routers can go down temporarily due to maintenance or failure. If any message, i.e., both initialization and hash chain update, arrives inbetween, then the router may miss it. Our solution is that the neighbor router temporarily caches the messages and resends it whenever the router is up. Note that after the BGP session is re-established, a neighbor needs to exchange the entire routing table which include the hash values.
Dealing with the ordering of the initial announcement. Compared with previous approaches, HC-BGP does not have a central trust entity (PKI) to answer the who can announce what question. Therefore, at any time, the attacker can start the initialization process independently to create the initial hash value of prefix p. Assuming an attacker announces p at time t 1 , and the owner announces p at time t 2 . We analyze the outcome depending on the ordering of events. If t 1 t 2 , i.e., attacker announces after the owner, other ASes can reject the bogus route due to mismatch in hash values. If t 1 ≈ t 2 , the partial ordering algorithm can ensure most ASes accept the valid route. If t 1 t 2 , i.e., the attacker announces p much earlier, we discuss two cases depending on the prefix type. If p is unallocated, i.e., a bogon prefix, such routes can be filtered using a bogon filter list. If prefix p is allocated to the owner but is never announced, the attacker can successfully hijack it. However, since these prefixes are unused, there is no legitimate traffic destined to it, leading to minimal impact. Moreover, it is very easy for the owner to detect it since the owner will also receive the bogus route.
Evaluation
In this section, we first demonstrate that HC-BGP's partial ordering algorithm introduces negligible propagation delays for routing updates. We then evaluate the benefit of partial deployment.
Experimental evaluation
We extend an existing simulator [24] used to study defenses against general prefix hijacking attacks, including subprefix hijacking. The simulator takes as input the AS-level topology from the public route repository [2], containing 23,289 ASes and 55,352 edges. The topology is labeled with the inferred AS relationship from Gao's algorithm [9] . The simulator models route propagation with the route selection guided by the routing decision process driven by relationshipbased routing policies. The simulator is able to simulate different prefix hijacking scenarios and generate a set of polluted ASes and the AS-level paths to reach hijacked prefixes.
For the cryptographic one-way hash function H[x], we choose to use AES block cipher in the hash construction [15] , which is also used in SPV [11] . The hash function is computationally infeasible for the attacker to derive the key x nor to find any other x such that
We use the default-free routing table from one vantage point in a Tier-1 network from RouteViews. Each prefix in the table is assigned an initial hash chain value, which is propagated to other ASes. The following simulation focuses on sub-prefix hijacking because it is most difficult to prevent and has large impact on the Internet.
Route propagation delay
The guidelines of partial ordering in §5 imposes additional propagation delay to the BGP system, which we quantify here. We first conduct the analysis using 3-day BGP data from RouteViews/RIPE. For each prefix update announced by a monitor non-Tier-1 AS, we compute the additional wait time needed for Tier-1 ASes to receive the update. We first group all updates for the same prefix across multiple vantage points using a previously established method [22] and then compute the time difference between the first update from a non-Tier-1 vantage point and the last update from any Tier-1 vantage point. The time difference conservatively estimates the additional delay due to partial ordering. Figure 8 shows that in 85% cases the additional latency is within 30 seconds. This study gives an accurate estimate of propagation delay increase using real-world data.
We also analyze the propagation delay perceived by any AS in the Internet. To study this, we further simulate the effect of imposing partial ordering using SSFNet [1] with the topology of 830 nodes provided by SSFNet. We show the average delay increase to propagate one prefix across all ASes before and after implementing our partial ordering algorithm. Figure 9 shows that 80% of the cases are within 40 seconds. It is slightly larger in SSFNet simulation than that in Figure 8 as all ASes are studied instead of just the Tier-1 ASes.
Efficiency under partial deployment
Quantifying the incremental benefit is important for understanding the adoptability of the protocol. We simulate the security guarantees under partial deployment. This benefit is two-fold. First, the participating ASes construct a barrier to stop propagating the new hash value to the attacker. Second, they detect hijacking by observing the conflicts.
First, we simulate the sub-prefix hijacking, which is much more difficult to prevent, by analyzing the effect of monitoring barrier under different partial deployment scenarios. In Figure 7 , we study how the degree of pollution changes with more deployed ASes.
For each experiment, we first randomly select a pair of ASes as the attacker and victim. Then we select the ASes to deploy the scheme using the following strategies. 1. Resilience: select the non-Tier-1 ASes which appear most times on the path from other ASes to any Tier-1 AS. These ASes are important for preventing polluting Tier-1 ASes. 2. Victimcentric: select the ASes nearest to the victim in terms of AS path length. 3. Random: select the ASes randomly.
We can see in Figure 7 that victim-centric performs best as it guarantees the route propagated to ASes while preventing the hash value from leaking to the attacker.
We also simulate the likelihood of inconsistency detection. We first randomly select 50 victims. For each victim, 50 attackers are selected randomly. The attacker can perform three types of attacks. For each attack type, we define the detection as follows.
(1) The attacker modifies p's initial value h n (s p ). An AS detects this if two routes received carry different h n values. (2) To launch full-prefix hijacking, the attacker intercepts p, h c−1 (s p ) announced by the new origin, and announces it with its own origin AS. An AS detects this if the two routes for p received use the same h c−1 (s p ), but different origin ASes. (3) To launch the sub-prefix hijacking, the attacker replaces the legitimate sub-prefix p 1 with another sub-prefix p 2 . Similarly, an AS detects it if the two routes received for two different sub-prefixes have the same hash value of the cover-prefix.
For types 1 and 2, certain ASes may not detect the inconsistency as the ASes along the propagation path may select one of them as the best route and propagate it. We focus on simulating the first two types. Type 3 can easily be detected by any ASes because p 1 and p 2 are disjoint prefixes so that both of them are always propagated.
We study the fraction of ASes capable of observing conflicts under partial deployment. In the simulation, the ASes observing the conflicts acts as a legacy AS and propagate the best route of the two. Figure 10 shows the fraction of ASes observing the inconsistencies. The upper bound 60% is caused by the set of single-homed ASes that never observe two routes to one destination. Once detected, the AS can trace back to the malicious AS hop-by-hop. The malicious AS is usually detected very quickly within few hops.
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of our protocol in terms of computation and storage resource consumptions. We compare our solution with S-BGP and its variants.
Computational complexity. As stated in §4.3, HC-BGP is computationally efficient because of two key characteristics: use of inexpensive cryptographic primitive (hash chain) and requiring cryptographic computations in uncommon cases.
To accurately assess the computation overhead of our algorithm, we profile the CPU overhead for key generation and verification separately. For objective comparison, we also implement the generation and verification process of the address attestation in S-BGP. Note that we only compare with the first phase, address attestation of S-BGP for fairness. We All  T1-T1  T2-T2  T3-T3  T1-T2  T2-T3  T3- first analyze the computational overhead of individual operations on these two protocols. For S-BGP, the computational overhead of the address attestation part is proportional to the number of updates. Its U pdateN um×T ime(encrypt) for owner and U pdateN um × T ime(decrypt) for receiver, where U pdateN um is the total number of updates per day and the T ime() is the expensive asymmetric cryptographic primitives. In our scheme, the computational cost for the owner is times more efficient than S-BGP. From the three-month data, we estimate the benefit is 2.6 × 10 4 . The verification involves only one hash operation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose HC-BGP, a new architecture for securing prefix ownership. HC-BGP uses an efficient cryptographic primitive, one-way hash chain, to verify that the current message is sent from the authenticated identity associated with the previous message. We demonstrate how HC-BGP can prevent both full prefix as well as sub-prefix hijacking attacks. To further improve efficiency, HC-BGP only requires verification when the origin changes. Instead of requiring a centralized PKI, HC-BGP relies on the existing hop-by-hop trust relationship. It provides a partial ordering algorithm to prevent any malicious network from tampering the messages.
